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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, A UTAH 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NOEL OKAMOTO and SUSIE S. 
OKAMOTO, His Wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16904 
-----------------------------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final order and judgment of the 
Second District Court, Weber County, Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
presiding, arising out of a condemnation action. The judgment had 
been stipulated with the matter of interest on the award reserved for 
determination on appeal. The City at first sought summary disposition 
tmder Rule 73 but this was denied. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant City seeks a reversal of the interest portion of 
the award as contained in the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff City commenced this eminent domain proceeding 
seeking to condemn the unimproved real property belonging to defendant 
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for the purpose of construction of a new municipal building. Several 
adjoining tracts, all unimproved, were 
Appeals in those cases: (Case No. 16902 
the same time. They were consolidated 
filed against at the same time\ 
and Case No. 16903) are here al 
for trial below. 
1 
Plaintiff in its complaint prayed for an order of occupancy 
but never did formally move the Court for an order, nor did it ever 
enter or take actual possession nor commence any construction. 
Defendant or defendants in answering admitted all the 
material allegations of the complaint but denied that just compensa-
tion had been offered (though there was no al legation in the complain 
that any offer had ever been made) . The prayer in the answer request 
an award of just compensation together with interest from the date of 
acceptance of service of sunnnons. 
The matter of just compensation for the taking was subse-
quently agreed upon and a stipulation entered into. This reserved 
for appeal thematter of determination of the date from which the 
interest should connnence to run. Judgment was entered for the amount 
agreed upon together with interest from the date of acceptance of 
service. The principal amount has been paid. A final order of con-
demnation awaits the determination of the interest question pursuant 
to the stipulation. A fourth contiguous piece of property which had 
a house on it was also involved., This was the subject of a separate 
settlement however, and it is not involved in this appeal. 
- 2 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
INTEREST ON A CONDEMNATION AWARD RUNS FROM THE DATE 
OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OR ORDER OF OCCUPANCY, WHICH-
EVER IS EARLIER. 
The judgment was drawn pursuant to the lower Court's pre-
trial order which found that the allegations of the City's complaint 
having been admitted and the City praying for occupancy even though 
no hearing was held nor any order entered, nor any possession actually 
taken, the value of the property was substantially destroyed since 
possession could have been taken anytime. Interest was therefore 
allowed from the date of acceptance of service of summons. In effect 
the position of the defendants and that of the lower Court is that by 
admitting the allegations in the complaint the defendants have, in 
effect, abandoned the property to the City. 
The statute, 78-34-9 UCA 1953 as amended, is quite lengthly 
but provides in essence that the plaintiff may move the Court for an 
order of occupancy after connnencement of the action the same to be 
granted or refused according to the equity of the case. If granted, 
the condemnor must post an amount equal to 75% of its appraised 
value of the premises. The right to just compensation shall then vest 
and be thereafter determined. The particular language as to interest 
is as follows: 
" .The rights of just compensation for the land 
so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled 
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained 
- 3 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and awarded as provided in section 78-34-10 and 
established by judgment therein, and the said 
judgment shall include, as part of the just 
compensation awarded, interest at the rate or 
8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as 
the value of the property and damages, from 
the date of taking actual possession thereof 
by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, which-
ever is earlier, to the date of judgment; .... " 
The granting of an order is discretionary with the Court and is 
granted consistent with the equities in the case, or is accordingly 
refused. Utah Copper v. Montana Bingham Consol. Min. Co. 69 U.423, 
255 P. 672; State v. Denver & Rio Grande 8 U2d 236, 332 P.2d 926. 
Under the theory of respondent, it would not make any difference if 
the Court, upon application, were to refuse to grant the order if the 
other facts were present as in the instant case, i.e. , the defendant 1 
admission of the plaintiff's allegations coupled with the prayer for 
an order. In other words, if the City prays for an order and the 
defendant admits all allegations then the City has constructively 
possessed and is liable for interest from the date of service of 
summons whether the Court is formally moved for an order or not. No 
judicial pron,ouncenient of this assertion has been found. 
This Court has uniformly held, pursuant to the statute, th 
interest runs from the date of actual possession or order of occupan I 
whichever is earlier. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 u. 147, 
80 P. 732; State v. Peek, 1 U2d 263, 265 P .2d 630; State v. Bettil on; 
Inc., 17 U2d 135, 405 P. 2d 420. These cases are illustrative of the 
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though there are many others which follow the rule. See also the 
excellent discussion in Independent School Dist. v. c. B. Lauch 
Const. Co. 305 P.2d 1077 (Idaho) which cites the Utah cases and 
couunents on various annotations discussing the rule. The Idaho 
statute is similar to that of Utah and the Idaho Court accordingly 
acknowledged no interest to be allowable prior to entry. This Court 
said in Peek at P. 269: 
"Appellants have cited no case and we have found 
none which holds that where under the state law 
the taking occurs when the possession of the 
property is actually surrendered, and not when 
the suit was commenced, that the failure to 
allow interest from the time of the commencement 
of the action constitutes a violation of these 
constitutional provisions, but a number of 
courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States, have held to the contrary 
'(citing authority)'. So we will adhere to 
our previous rule that interest is recoverable 
only from the time of taking possession of the 
property." 
And again at Pages 267 and 268: 
"Appellants are not entitled to interest on the judgment prior to the time when actual possession 
was taken. This Court has uniformly so held 
(citing cases)." 
The same quote came from Bettilyon at pages 137 and 138: 
"Interest accrues only from the time of actual 
taking of possession by occupation or entry or 
upon final judgment and order of condemnation 
(citing cases)." 
Would anyone advising a condemning authority under our state of facts 
feel comfortable in telling it to go upon the ground without an agree-
ment allowing entry or a formal order of the Court so authorizing. 
At this time the owner still retains the fee interest until it is 
- 5 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
divested by judicial proceeding. Any physical entry outside the pr 
tection of either would be tortious. 
We call attention again to Jones v. Oregon Short Line, 
supra. There the appellants argued that there was in effect a takir 
at the time of service of summons so compensation became due then 
and interest should be allowed from then until verdict. This Court 
held that in determining the interest claim it must be determined 
when there was a taking since the condemner is not required to make 
compensation until the taking either actual or constructive. The 
material point therefore is when did the taking occur. Trial and 
verdict determining liability were held to constitute the taking not· 
the service of sunnnons. It was observed that Sec. 3599 R. S. Utah 19 
(now 78-34-11) fixes the time with reference to which compensationi 
to be computed rather than fixing the time of taking. There was in 
Jones no physical entry nor occupation nor was any requested. Inter 
was held allowable therefore as of the time of taking. 
In the case at bar we submit there was no taking until the 
judgment. We, therefore, allow interest from the date of taking 
actual possession or entry of the order of occupancy under 78-34-9 
or pursuant to the provisions of 78-34-13 after the lapse of 30 days 
after judgment. If respondent's position is correct then the proper 
must necessarily be deemed to have been taken at the time of accepta 
of service of summons. This does not accord with the decisions of 
this Court. 
- 6 
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We have found no case which, under the facts of the one at 
bar, would say that a plaintiff has actually possessed the property 
involved. Actual according to its connnon meaning means existing in 
fact or reality and not false or apparent. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court erred in allowing the computation of 
interest from the date of acceptance of service of summons, actual 
possession not being taken nor any order of occupancy asked for nor 
granted. 
RICHARD L. STINE 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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